



***Da'wah Tarbiyah* of the Indonesian Muslim Students Islamic Union (KAMMI): Political Communication and Public Opinion Perspective**

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Abstrak

Kata kunci:

*Dakwah tarbiyah,
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komunikasi
politik, opini
publik*

Tujuan penelitian adalah menganalisis dakwah tarbiyah pada organisasi Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI) dalam perspektif komunikasi politik dan opini publik. Metodologi yang digunakan adalah kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi pustaka. Data dikumpulkan dari berbagai jurnal, buku, dan hasil penelitian yang diterbitkan secara online. Teknik analisis data adalah dengan menggunakan teknik mengalir (reduksi data, displai data, dan penarikan kesimpulan penelitian). Sifat analisis data yang dilakukan dalam penelitian adalah deskriptif analitis dengan cara membuat deskripsi dan menganalisis seluruh data pustaka yang telah didapatkan. Kesimpulan penelitian ini adalah dakwah tarbiyah KAMMI memiliki hubungan ideologi dengan PKS dan Ikhwanul muslimin. Tiopologi dakwah tarbiyah KAMMI berbentuk konservatif, akomodatif, dan reformis dengan mengusung visi menyatukan negara dengan Islam. KAMMI membangun dakwah tarbiyah dengan melakukan komunikasi politik bersama PKS sebagai rumah gerakan. Organisasi ini membangun opini publik agar dakwah tarbiyah diterima oleh masyarakat muslim. Komunikasi politik dan opini publik yang diperjuangkan oleh organisasi ekstra kampus ini dengan mengintegrasikan dakwah dan politik agar Islam bisa menjadi ideologi formal dalam membangun negara.

Abstract

Keywords:

*Da'wah tarbiyah,
KAMMI,
political
communication,
public opinion*

The purpose of the study was to analyze *Da'wah Tarbiyah* of the Indonesian Muslim Students Islamic Union (KAMMI) from the perspective of political communication and public opinion. The methodology used is qualitative with a literature study approach. Data was collected from various journals, books, and research results published online. Data analysis techniques use flowing techniques (data reduction, data display, and drawing research conclusions). The nature of data analysis carried out in the study is descriptive-analytical by making



descriptions and analyzing all library data that has been obtained. This study concludes that the *Da'wah Tarbiyah* of KAMMI has a romantic relationship with Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Muslim Brotherhood. The typology of the *Da'wah Tarbiyah* is conservative, accommodating, and reformist, carrying out the vision of uniting the state with Islam. KAMMI built *Da'wah Tarbiyah* by conducting political communication with the PKS as the house of the movement. This organization makes public opinion so that the Muslim community accepts *Da'wah Tarbiyah*. This extra-campus organization fights political communication and public opinion by integrating da'wah and politics so that Islam can become a formal ideology in building the country.

INTRODUCTION

This study analyses the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI) political *Da'wah* movement. This research is considered necessary because the KAMMI carries out activities using the ideology of *Tarbiyah*. The KAMMI builds a conservative, accommodating, and reformist political Islamic ideology called *global Santri* (Machmudi, 2008). Interestingly, the ideology of *Da'wah Tarbiyah*, the KAMMI organisation, relates to the *Da'wah Tarbiyah* ideology of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Rahmadani & Arifin, 2018; Grace, 2008). They ideologically recognise that Islam is the best system for managing the country. Although on their journey, the KAMMI and the PKS entered the democratic system as a way to build Islamic civilisation nationally and globally (Hasan, 2012).

Several studies on the KAMMI, for example, Kraince (2000), concluded that the KAMMI's political steps were carried out relatively even though it still carried the symbol of Islamic politics to voice peaceful reforms. The moderate political steps taken by KAMMI can be seen in its stance of accepting democracy as a middle ground. KAMMI ideologically rejects extreme thinking that Islam is not in line with democracy (Wijonarko, 2009). The KAMMI's political move, regardless of its ideological debate, whether moderate or genealogical to Hasan Al-Banna's brotherhood, this student movement was born out of the political contestation of 1998 (Rahmadani & Arifin, 2018; Ulum, 2006). KAMMI's practical political move caused this student movement to be at a difficult choice, whether to remain affiliated with *Da'wah Tarbiyah* or move independently (Fakhrurrazi, 2019).

The theory used to analyse the discourse of KAMMI *Da'wah Tarbiyah* uses the theory of political communication and public opinion. Referring to Nimmo (2005), political communication and public opinion are divided into three concepts: understanding human beings (self-action,



interaction, and transactions), political communication, and communication perspectives on public opinion. It is the process of self-meaning of man that becomes influenced by himself and external factors. Politics has the same process as communication with the principle of what, when, and how. Communication in one action must at least answer several questions such as who, saying what, with what channel, to whom, and with what effect (Nimmo, 2005).

The discourse on KAMMI *Da'wah Tarbiyah* will be answered with an important question, how is KAMMI *Da'wah Tarbiyah* in the perspective of political communication and public opinion? The primary question is then elaborated with a minor question 1) What does *Da'wah Tarbiyah* look like to be interpreted based on self-action, interaction, and transactions? To what extent is the political communication carried out by this Islamic organisation in the *da'wah* activities of *Tarbiyah*? Why does this organisation carry out communication activities from the public opinion perspective in *Da'wah Tarbiyah*?

METHOD

This research uses qualitative research. This qualitative researcher does not seek to make generalizations or objectivity like quantitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2019; Gibbs, 2007; Golafshani, 2003). Furthermore, the research approach used to answer the problem is literature research. Data collection is carried out only based on literature reviews in journals, theses, theses, dissertations, books and several sources obtained online. The focus of the object of this study is the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit (KAMMI) which is ideologically related to the *Da'wah* of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The data analysis technique used is by the technical flow. The flowing technique reduces data in the data supply and interprets conclusions (Adeni, 2016; Miles et al., 2014). The nature of data analysis carried out in the study is descriptive-analytical by making a description and analyzing all library data that has been obtained (Rukajat, 2018; Utami & Ratnawati, 2022).

FINDING AND DISCUSSION

Overview of *Da'wah Tarbiyah* PKS and KAMMI

The PKS carries one ideological terminology, *Da'wah Tarbiyah*, as a regeneration system (Tunjungsari, 2017; Wahid, 2019). Initially, this Islamic party was declared under the name of *Keadilan Party* (PK), which was inaugurated in 1998 at the Hall of the Great Mosque of Al-Azhar, South Jakarta (Fadlillah, 2018; Sholeh, 2015). Unlike other Islamic parties, which depend on shops or figures, the PKS promotes egalitarianism. The party does not have a dominant key



figure, for example, Abdurrahman Wahid in the National Awakening Party. This party uses the principle of egalitarianism, which assumes all party members are equal and equal (Dhyatmika, 2013). The community accepts PKS works by communicating with cadres, sympathisers, and the public. PKS also conducts political communication through rhetoric, propaganda, public relations, political campaigns, and lobbying (Nurussa'adah, 2018). The communication is carried out, borrowing the thesis of Habibi PKS with a look that prioritises morals and civility so that it can be accepted by the community (Habibi, 2019).

Da'wah Tarbiyah as a regeneration system is carried out by fostering networks, namely *usroh*, *halaqah*, *liqo'*, *rihlah*, *mukhoyyam*, *daurah*, and *nadwah* (Haya, 2014, p. ii). The vision of the PKS from 2020-2021 is written: "To become an Islamic Party of *Rahmatan Lil 'Alamin* that is strong and foremost in serving the people and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia" (DPP PKS, 2021). This Islamist ideological party has built an extensive *network of liqo'* at the national and international levels (Fuad, 2019; Wahyudi, 2017). Initially, this party did stand as a party with Islamic *da'wah* ideology, which later preferred to be an open mass-based party (Aminuddin, 2010; Aminuddin & Masykuri, 2015). Islamic ideology was maintained despite the party's mass-building and working on democracies. With its Islamic ideology, in the 2019 elections, PKS was once considered to be failing to enter parliament. In reality, PKS can still get parliament seats and become a solid mass-based party (Siregar et al., 2020; Siregar, 2020).

The global terminology *Santri* used in this study is to use Machmudi's thesis (2008) in his paper "*The Emergence of New Santri in Indonesia*". On a more general concept, they are called the religious typology of *new students*. On the typology of political movements, they are interested in movements of a trans-national nature. *New Santri* is known for its tendency to take on global issues in the Islamic world (Saat & Burhani, 2020). They are the younger generation who experience moral *panic* to identify themselves as traditionalists or modernists (Kailani, 2011). More specifically, their political movement is related to ideology with PKS hence the name of *Santri Post-Islamism* (Saat & Burhani, 2020). The term *Santri post-Islamism* has been debated since 2019, when there was a political contestation between Supporters of Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto. Although it is still a matter of debate, in this study, *post-Islamism* students can very well be related to the phenomenon of PKS (Hasan, 2018; Ibrahim, 2018; Sani & Hantoro, 2018).

The purpose of global *Da'wah Tarbiyah* is to want to pattern the country with Islamic values and all its supporting devices. Despite the fact. Uniting Islam and the state is not an easy matter (Kamil, 2013) and is usually triggered by internal factors that cause failure (R, 2011; Romli, 2004). This idea intersects the thesis of Effendy (2003, 2011) and Rosyidin (2015) that



recognising *Shari'a* as a whole system of life is one thing while understanding it correctly is another region. Although many Islamic parties have emerged, during elections in Indonesia have never been won because there are internal conflicts within the body of the Islamic party (Noor, 2015). Conditions also occur in the KAMMI organisation, experiencing a phase in which internal conflicts occur that cause division in the organisation's body. The KAMMI's internal conflicts have arisen since its founder was fired from PKS, namely Fahri Hamzah (Akmar, 2019; Faiz & Akhmadi, 2016; Kurniawati, 2021). Some of the founding figures of the KAMMI who left the PKS later founded the Indonesian New Direction Movement (GARBI) mass organisation. The GARBI Mass Organization became a political party named the Great Indonesia Wave Party (Gelora Party) (Priohutomo et al., 2019).

The KAMMI was declared at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang on March 29, 1998, in response to the authoritarian New Order Regime (Wildan, 2020). This movement was born from the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK) embryo. (Husin, 2014) The vision of their political movements is to want the management of a state based on Islam even though it remains a democratic state (Umar, 2014). Religious typology, this organisation underlies religious understanding in the style of Islamic ideology, indoctrination and fanatic (Ulum, 2006). Post-Reformation, the KAMMI tried to fight for Islam as an ideology despite being in a democratic country, so their political typology could be called *post-Islamism*. The KAMMI action movement, as a work of *Da'wah Tarbiyah* as well as politics, is called the street parliament because every action is carried out with demonstrations. In every government, the KAMMI is always present to demonstrate against government policies that are considered to have failed to manage the state (Ardianto, 2021; Patel, 2019).

KAMMI's Self-Action, Interaction and Transactions

Self-action in *Da'wah Tarbiyah* is carried out because of the impulse in oneself that considers Islam to be a political religion (Sugara et al., 2019). They are the younger generation of the Muslim middle class who realize that Islam is the best way to manage the country. They carried out one interpretation of the failure of the democratic system to the management of the state. Democracy in the end they understood as only one way to realize the highest ideal that the state should be managed in an Islamic way. Although they are different from other Islamic political movements, namely Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Ishomuddin, 2016). KAMMI and PKS chose the path by entering democracy while HTI chose to reject the democratic system. KAMMI is a representation of the Muslim youth movement that views politics as one way (Ardianto, 2021). Starting from the campus mosque, they realized that *da'wah* in political areas became a



necessity. Because Islam itself according to them is a religion that cannot be separated from political and state affairs (Atika et al., 2016).

KAMMI actually wanted that the relationship between religion and the state could be classified into three forms, namely *integrated* (union between religion and state), *intersectional* (intersection between religion and state), and *secularistic* (separation between religion and state). In addition, Islam with the state has an inseparable relationship. Islam already has a system or governs the constitution well. Islam will also be present as a foundation for the noble values of society. Islam in the context of the state becomes a fundamental means to realize a just and prosperous state. Based on these two views, KAMMI is a student political movement that realizes that Islam and the state become an inseparable entity. The state will become safe and peaceful if it is managed by Islam as a value and ideology (Basit, 2016).

The *global* interaction of students in Da'wah Tarbiyah is influenced by their social and economic position. KAMMI cadres are all Muslim students who are intellectually middle class. Socially, in society they have a good social standing compared to the younger generation who are not students. In line, that KAMMI is a student movement that is not only political but also as a social movement of the community. This gives an idea that KAMMI builds interaction with the community through socio-political movements (Fitriani, 2010; Fitrianita & Ambarsari, 2018). The failure of economic development during the New Order period was one factor in the establishment of this organization. The economy is an important part that the KAMMI movement must strive for because the economy is also an important part of politics (Iskandar et al., 2018).

Interaction in Da'wah Tarbiyah is a self-impulse that is then influenced by impulses outside of himself, namely the environment and ideology of Hasan Al Banna's brotherhood. In addition, their transactions are influenced by a higher structure, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The tarbiyah ideology they developed is the result of a transaction with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Haryanto, 2019). In addition, family background, social environment, and individual choices and expectations greatly influence the cadre's decision to survive or not to survive as KAMMI cadres (Fitrianita & Ambarsari, 2018). Globalization and modernism influenced the dynamics of the KAMMI movement to this day. History is also an important factor, that KAMMI is a student movement that took part in overthrowing Suharto from his power (Adiwilaga, 2019). This history is an important factor that is the focus of the KAMMI movement, that the Indonesian state has experienced a difficult time under the new order. KAMMI is a resistance movement against corrupt regimes. KAMMI eventually built various social, political, and religious movements that voiced the voice of the Indonesian people through street parliaments.



Interactions are also carried out to build international networks by assisting various representatives in other countries. The latest organizational network, for example, the inauguration of the Special Region Management of KAMMI Turkey for the 2020-2021 period which was declared at the Aspendos Ancient Theater, Serik Antalya, Turkey. The inauguration carried the theme "The KAMMI Diaspora and the Global Vision of Muslim Intellectuals". In addition, since 2014, before the occurrence of internal conflicts, KAMMI has made a target to recruit approximately 100 thousand cadres from among students. The program became one of the programs launched by the management of PP KAMMI and dozens of KAMMI cadres of regional envoys and Commissariats throughout Jakarta (detiknews, 2014). The network is a very important system that makes KAMMI still able to survive today. The cadre network created is what then makes KAMMI have a militant cadre (Achmad, 2020)

Based on the entire view of the above from the point of view of the transaction, although many external factors influenced, the choice of staying as a KAMMI cadre in Da'wah Tarbiyah was determined by each individual. The tiered and time-consuming regeneration does not completely affect how long they can stay in the KAMMI organization. This gives an idea that the success or failure of KAMMI political regeneration is influenced by the awareness factor. External factors that hinder the implementation of KAMMI political education are the lack of student awareness of the importance of political education and students' pragmatic attitudes.

Political Communication of KAMMI

KAMMI Da'wah Tarbiyah can also be understood as a process of communication by conducting public opinion. Political communication is carried out with personal construction in building a network of political da'wah. The personal construction carried out is to use an established system of regeneration. The regeneration system is carried out by looking for loyal cadres in Da'wah Tarbiyah. Students who become cadres are then educated to become individuals who carry the identity of Muslim statesmen. This personal construction is certainly one way so that KAMMI can be accepted by a plural Indonesian society. One way to keep KAMMI cadres holding Islam as an ideology is to require their cadres to memorize the Qur'an. Borrowing Rahmawati's idea, this campus rohis da'wah is referred to as a movement for the formation of student morals through the Campus Da'wah Institute (LDK) and KAMMI (Hidayati, 2020; Rahmawati, 2013). Personally, KAMMI cadres are cadre organizations (*harokatut tajnid*) and movement organizations (*harokatul amal*) (Wahyuni, 2013)

Personal construction is also carried out by looking at the condition of Islam nationally and globally which is in trouble. They can be an intellectually Muslim middle class who see Islam as



the solution to various problems that occur in the nation and state. The state is considered an accepted object then interpreted in various ways. The interpretation that became the ideology of the movement that the state has so far failed to provide justice for the people. Although the way of seeing the political object they see is subjectively interpreted. At least it is influenced by their own self-motivation that wants them to participate in politics. Personal construction of KAMMI is then realized as the basis for collective movement in organizational activities.

Social construction is carried out by conducting public opinion, namely by demonstrations on the street. During this time, KAMMI in his movement has always been a resistance movement on the street. The demonstration then resulted in the opinions of other groups that played a role. An example is when KAMMI took part in overthrowing the New Order regime. The social construction that is built is of course not alone and involves other elements, namely society and students. Using these social constructions, KAMMI became a solid movement. After successfully overthrowing the New Order Regime, their cadres formed a political party, namely the PKS. Until now KAMMI continues to build social construction in society so that their movement can be accepted.

Political construction is carried out by connecting public opinion, popular opinion, and mass opinion with the activities of public officials (executives, legislators, and judges) who are equally responsible for the initiation, formulation, acceptance, application, interpretation and assessment of various policies. KAMMI became a student movement that carried out public opinion to criticize government policies that were considered failed. During the New Order, Reformation, and Transition, KAMMI built its political construction by conducting various demonstration activities. In addition, KAMMI built a political construction through their representatives who were already members of the legislature. The political constructions voiced are usually related to corruption, economics, legal injustice, international issues (Palestinian Independence, Rohingnya, Uighurs, etc.) (KAMMI & Febrianto, 2016).

Public Opinion Perspectives of KAMMI

KAMMI is a student political movement built on Islam as the ideology of the movement (Rasyid et al., 2019). Their members consist of students spread throughout Indonesia, both public and private campuses (Ardianto, 2021). In krode of the KAMMI movement it is written "We are people who think and will be free. No one person can force us to act. We only act on the basis of understanding, not taklid, as well as on the basis of sincerity, not seeking praise or position." Furthermore, they write that their days are always decorated with *Tilawah*, *Dzikr*, exhorting each other in truth, and patience (Al-Kalam & Prabowo, 2021). The credo of this



movement gives an idea that KAMMI is actually a moderate political movement. They use the idea of understanding to be able to become an established organization. As a splintered organization, no organization or power can force them. This is evidenced by the fact that until now KAMMI still remains the opposition to the government.

The typology of their da'wah movement is globally derived from the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The movement, to borrow dwiastono's (2019) report, is an exclusive student movement. The rise of KAMMI into an organization that has a high nationalist spirit, as evidenced by every government policy that is not in line with the interests of the people, that is where KAMMI carries out actions using the media or direct demonstrations. Kraince (2000) has long suspected that KAMMI is a moderate student Islamic organization. Although at every movement he always criticized the government which was considered to have failed to run the wheels of government. In the narrative of movement patterns and narratives, KAMMI uses an Islamic narrative approach with syamil Islam (Hakam et al., 2020),

Historically, KAMMI voiced the descent of President Soeharto, who was in power for 32 years. This demand was successful with the resignation of President Soeharto on May 21, 1998 (Galih, 2018). During the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration, KAMMI demanded the settlement of Hambalang corruption and Century Bank (Iskandar, 2012). In the 2014-2019 elections, KAMMI built an idea that Indonesia's leader should be a Muslim Statesman (Suhartono, 2008). In the first term of President Jokowi's leadership, KAMMI once demonstrated and demanded three things. The first demand is that the president must immediately stabilize the prices of people's needs, such as basic necessities, fuel oil (BBM), basic electricity tariffs (TDL), LPG, and so on. The second demand is that the president can generate international political power and the sovereignty of the Indonesian nation. The third demand is that the president can strengthen the eradication of corruption and law enforcement in Indonesia (Murdaningsih, 2015).

The description above gives an idea that during the period of the Leadership of the New Order, Reform, and Transition, KAMMI was a movement that became an opision of the government. In fact, at the leadership of SBY and PKS entered into a governing coalition (Alvionitasari & Amirullah, 2018; BBC News Indonesia, 2012). KAMMI remains loyal to the government's opposition. The student movement continued to hold demonstrations in the streets to protest government policies that were considered detrimental to society. Their demonstrations focused on issues of corruption, economy, corruption, fuel oil (BBM), and others. Despite carrying out the idea of Islamic politics as an ideology, KAMMI has never demonstrated demanding that Indonesia replaced it with an Islamic system. The street



demonstrations that were carried out only demanded that the president improve the condition of the nation that was not yet sovereign. The most frequently voiced issues are for example demands to resolve various corruption cases in Indonesia and global Islamic issues.

In voicing its demands, this Islamic student organization is more concerned with street demonstrations. Thus, in its development, because it used the road as a demonstration, this movement was called a street parliament. Although, on its way, many former KAMMI administrators who entered parliament became members of the legislature (for example: Fahri Hamzah, Anis Matta, Mahfudz Siddiq, Andi Rahmat, etc)." In addition, the development of information technology requires them to use mass media as a channel for their political messages. They use social media youtube, Instagram, websites etc. as a medium of political communication. Despite the large number of social media emergencies, KAMMI still took to the streets to hold demonstrations. Their movement continued to use demonstrations on the street to voice various conditions of government that were considered to be a failure in the management of the country.

KAMMI in its movement builds communication with various parties, especially the PKS. KAMMI also builds communication with the entire student network in Indonesia. As explained in the previous description, KAMMI's thinking adapts the idea of PKS and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Hasan, 2018). Some KAMMI alumni have entered parliament by becoming members of the legislature, with them then KAMMI establishing communication. Political movements are communicated to build Indonesia. They also communicate with all representatives who are abroad. Their goal is to be able to participate in solving various Islamic problems in the country with a formalistic Islamic concept.

For KAMMI, Islam is a perspective as well as a lifestyle because Islam is not only related to ritual worship. A person's recognition as a Muslim is not only evidenced by the identity listed in the population or clothing administration (Juraini, 2019). But the logical consequence of professing faith is to live the teachings of Islam and stay away from Islamic prohibitions. One Islamic commandment is to liberate man from backwardness. The process starts from *ishlahunnafs*, to making Islam a *ustadziyatul 'alam* (the pillar of civilization). To achieve that, a systemic as well as gradual change is needed, the one means of which is. Islamic State, does not mean that everything must be Muslim, but it is enough to run a system of government and a state based on Islamic law. This idea gives an idea that the relationship between Islam and the state fought for by KAMMI is formalistic, not substantive or liberalist



As a result of the emerging, this organization is considered a radical movement. Various demonstrations were carried out, often caused various clashes with the police. The political movements they have made so far have not been able to realize the ideals they have built, for example, the country must be free from corruption. Their successful movement was in 1998 with the people succeeding in overthrowing the power of the New Order. Their political da'wah movement has not been accepted by the public because it is considered radical. Precisely what happened was that the demonstration movement they carried out was always regarded as a radical movement hostile to a constitutionally legitimate government. So, it can be concluded that until now they are global students who are considered to want to build Indonesia with a country with Islamic ideology. Although, they entered into a democratic system that was regarded as only one way of realizing the ideal of uniting Islam and the state.

Discussion

After the fall of the New Order Regime, Islamic parties later gained the freedom to grow. At that time, at the beginning of the Reformation, there were many political parties, such as the Justice Party (PK). The party did not pass the parliamentary threshold then in 2004 it changed its name to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). This Islamic mass-based party undermines the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt. The movement figures who became a source of inspiration, for example, were Hasan Al-Banna and Sayid Qutb. This Islamic mass-based party is actually an evolution of the Islamic student movement. The Islamic student organization that participated in overthrowing the New Order government is called the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit. Their regeneration uses the Da'wah Tarbiyah system which is also used as a PKS da'wah movement. Their movements, PKS and KAMMI were originally the idea of uniting between Islam and the state.

In practice, the idea of uniting the state with religion is not an easy matter. Muslims themselves have a different view in looking at the relationship between Islam and the state. His scholars for example divide the typology of Islamic and state relations into three (liberalist, formalistic, and substantive). With this division of three typologies, it indirectly creates one barrier to unite Islam in one idea of Islam and the state. Muslims have never been able to realize a single order that unites Islam and the state. Islam is ultimately only regarded as a teaching that does not have to take care of the state. Politics became a terminology that was not part of Islamic da'wah.

Despite the above debates, in the course of history, there remains a group that seeks to unite Islam and the state. The Islamic populism movement (the rise of Islam) came to the forefront of



the response to state management which was considered a failure. When corruption is incapable of being resolved by the state, then Islamic populism emerges later as an opponent. The issue of Islam globally is also a concern for this Islamic populism movement. The movement adopts a transnational Islamic mindset. Their movement can be called *global santri* or *post-Islamism santri* by carrying Islam as the ideology of the movement. They consider that Islamic traditionalism is unable to solve the problems that occur in the Islamic world today. Islamic traditionalism for them is simply trying to fight for Islam through cultural and educational channels.

For them the idea of traditionalism is no longer relevant in the midst of the influx of modernity. Traditionalism for them is just one way to assert about Indonesian Islam. But in global politics, traditionalism for them has not been able to solve the challenges of globalization and modernity. It is at this point that there is often a conflict between traditional Islam and transnational Islam (modern Islam). Adherents of traditional Islam (NU for example) consider them to be the Islam of the archipelago which is purely from Indonesian culture. They think transnational Islam is just an Islamic movement that seeks to replace the established state order. In contrast, transnational Islam considers that traditional Islam is not synonymous with Islam itself. Traditional Islam for them has stayed away from the substance of Islam itself which must be subject to the text of the Qur'an and the hadith of the Prophet.

So for KAMMI, modernity can be taken but Islam politically still has to be fought. Only Islam is the only ideology that can be used as a view of life. In their development, they entered the democratic system as a way to realize ideals. Democracy for them is only one way and not the real goal. Because for them, democracy is not the best system for managing the country. The system of a democratic state would be good if it was managed by muslim statesmen. They see the failure of state management so far caused by greedy politics. The state is only used as a means for certain people to enrich themselves to care about the sovereignty of the nation.

KAMMI as a representation of Da'wah Tarbiyah is a phenomenon of the rise of Islamic populism. They see that the world is already under the grip of globalization and Islam is inferior to Western slavery. They made one point that globalization and modernity were originally enemies for them. Subsequent developments, modernity they did not completely reject. They still carry Islam as a political ideology, but in identity they can be modern. Their intellectual ideas are also not only Islam traditionalist *an sich*. They are based on scholarship derived from western philosophical buildings such as politics, economics, culture and others. They were previously students who studied at islamic boarding schools, but later studied general knowledge at national and international campuses.



The typology of the KAMMI da'wah movement undermines the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. At the beginning their political da'wah movement could be said to be an exclusive student movement. KAMMI is an organization that has a high nationalist spirit, as evidenced by every government policy that is not in accordance with the interests of the people, that is where KAMMI takes action using the media or direct demonstrations. KAMMI is a moderate student Islamic organization. Although at every movement he always criticized the government which was considered to have failed to run the wheels of government. In the narrative of the pattern and narrative of the movement, KAMMI uses an Islamic narrative approach with syamil Islam,

Their da'wah movement can be called a street parliamentary movement. They took to the streets to do demonstrations at least also to be communicationally recognized by the public. As a street parliamentary movement, the issues they often voice include corruption, the economy, and others. In every regime of power, they remained steadfastly the opposition of the government. For example, under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, they remain critical of the government. In fact, the home of their movement, PKS is in the governing coalition. This did not make KAMMI stop to carry out street parliamentary movements. Until the masses during the second government of President Joko Widodo, KAMMI continued to move as a street parliament.

CONCLUSION

Political communication carried out by KAMMI organization is carried out by self-action in Da'wah Tarbiyah. KAMMI's organization carries out political communication because of the impulse of those who think Islam does not have to be separated from politics. Political communication is also carried out through interactions with the da'wah of the PKS Tarbiyah and the Muslim Brotherhood, which are influenced by social and economic position, social roles, ideological demands of the organization and others. Political communication in Da'wah Tarbiyah transactions is self-encouragement which is then influenced by impulses outside of himself, such as ideology, state, and political parties. The process of public opinion is carried out by personal, social, and political construction. Political communication and public opinion have been carried out by KAMMI cadres and organizations because Islam must be integrated with the state for them. The channels of political communication and public opinion used include building networks with political parties and the mass media and opposition against the government.



KAMMI is the face of the conservative, accommodating, and reformist Islamic student movement with a *global* religious typology. On the political typology side, they can be called *post-Islamism*. They carry out political communication and public opinion in a country that adheres to democracy to be accepted in the Indonesian Muslim community. The movement seemed conservative by uniting da'wah, politics and the state. For them, Islam is a whole system with a universal concept of building a single country. Democracy for them is only one way to be able to realize Islam as a country both nationally and globally. Da'wah Tarbiyah KAMMI is the new face of post-Islamism in the student political movement by uniting Islam and Indonesianness.

The results of this study have implications for the theory that only concludes that the KAMMI organization is only an organization of Islamic students in political movements. This is because, in addition to politics, KAMMI organization has a romantic relationship with the da'wah activities of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The KAMMI organization carried out political activities and built the ideology of Da'wah Tarbiyah that borrowed the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The weakness of this study is that it still uses limited literature studies. Library referencing based on the main books written by KAMMI members and organizational structures are still not fully used in this study. Because using a literature review, the results of this study are still subjective based on the researcher's interpretation of the literature data obtained. The following research can use field research. Further research can conduct interviews, observations, and documentation on the KAMMI management structure and KAMMI cadres.

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