

# METHOD OF *ISTINBATH AL-AHKAM* AND LAW SOCIALIZATION BY THE SALAFI-WAHABI *MANHAJ*: Impacts on Social Interactions

Armaya Azmi<sup>1</sup>, Faisar Ananda Arfa<sup>2</sup>, Zainul Fuad<sup>3</sup>, Syafaruddin<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1,2,3,4</sup>UIN Sumatra Utara

Jl. William Iskandar Ps. V, Deli Serdang, North Sumatra 20371

E-mail: <sup>1</sup>armaya@gmail.com; <sup>2</sup>faisar\_nanda@yahoo.co.id, <sup>3</sup>zainulfuad@uinsu.ac.id; <sup>4</sup>siagiansyafar@gmail.com

**Abstract:** This study examines the method of *istinbath al-ahkam* (deriving legal rulings) employed by scholars and leaders of the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* in issuing fatwas in North Sumatra and its impact on social interaction and harmony among different religious communities. The research adopts a combined approach, encompassing a doctrinal perspective on *istinbath al-ahkam* and a non-doctrinal view on legal socialization issues. Through literature review, interviews, and observations, data is gathered from the fatwas of Salafi-Wahabi scholars such as Sheikh Muhammad Nasiruddin Albani, Abdullah bin Baz, and Muhammad Shalih Fauzan. The findings indicate that the *istinbath al-ahkam* method applied by Salafi-Wahabi adheres to the principles of the *Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah*, though leaning towards the Hanbali school of thought. In legal socialization, Salafi-Wahabi initiates it from the smallest social units to educational institutions and media, with a focus on study circles (*halaqah*). This legal socialization enhances legal awareness among the people of North Sumatra but also brings the potential for conflict and disharmony. Certain teachings within the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj*, such as *tabdi'*, *tadlil*, *tahzir*, *takfiri*, and the restriction of learning exclusively from Salafi-Wahabi scholars, have the potential to create tension among groups and religious communities. While not all members of the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* share identical views, a majority tends to embrace these controversial concepts. Therefore, extremist ideologies emerging within the Salafi-Wahabi jihadist faction pose a potential threat to national political stability.

**Keywords:** Salafi-Wahabi; *manhaj*; *istinbath al-ahkam*; legal socialization

**Abstrak:** Penelitian ini mengkaji metode *istinbath al-ahkam* yang digunakan oleh para ulama dan pemimpin *manhaj* Salafi-Wahabi dalam mengeluarkan fatwa di Sumatera Utara dan dampaknya terhadap interaksi sosial dan kerukunan di antara berbagai komunitas agama yang berbeda. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan gabungan, yang mencakup perspektif doktrinal tentang *istinbath al-ahkam* dan pandangan non-doktrinal tentang isu-isu sosialisasi hukum. Melalui studi literatur, wawancara, dan observasi, data dikumpulkan dari fatwa-fatwa ulama Salafi-Wahabi seperti Syekh Muhammad Nasiruddin Albani, Abdullah bin Baz, dan Muhammad Shalih Fauzan. Temuan penelitian menunjukkan bahwa metode *istinbath al-ahkam* yang diterapkan oleh Salafi-Wahabi menganut prinsip-prinsip *Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah*, meskipun lebih condong ke mazhab Hanbali. Dalam sosialisasi hukum, Salafi-Wahabi memulainya dari unit sosial terkecil hingga lembaga pendidikan dan media, dengan fokus pada kelompok-kelompok pengajian (*halaqah*). Sosialisasi hukum ini meningkatkan kesadaran hukum di kalangan masyarakat Sumatera Utara, namun juga membawa potensi konflik dan ketidakharmonisan. Ajaran-ajaran tertentu dalam *manhaj* Salafi-Wahabi, seperti *tabdi'*, *tadlil*, *tahzir*, *takfiri*, dan pembatasan belajar secara eksklusif dari ulama Salafi-Wahabi, memiliki potensi untuk menciptakan ketegangan di antara kelompok-kelompok dan komunitas-komunitas keagamaan. Meskipun tidak semua anggota *manhaj* Salafi-Wahabi memiliki pandangan yang sama, mayoritas cenderung menganut konsep-konsep kontroversial ini. Oleh karena itu, ideologi ekstremis yang muncul di dalam faksi jihadis Salafi-Wahabi menimbulkan ancaman potensial terhadap stabilitas politik nasional.

**Kata kunci:** Salafi Wahabi; *manhaj*; *istinbath al-ahkam*; sosialisasi hukum

## Introduction

Around the 1980s, a group emerged within the Indonesian Muslim community known as the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj*. They named themselves as followers

of the as-Salafu as-Salih *manhaj*, emphasizing their adherence to the ways of the righteous predecessors, including the *sahabah* (companions of the Prophet), *tabi'in*, and *tabi'tabi'in*. They believed

that the actions of these predecessors, as outlined in the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, represented the best path in matters of faith and preaching. The term “Salafi” originated within the group itself, as quoted by Faizah from Khaled Abou El Fadl in his book *“The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from Extremists.”*<sup>1</sup>

The term “Wahabi” appended to the group’s name refers to their association with Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1115-1206 H/1703-1792 M), considered a reformer of Islamic teachings from Najd, Saudi Arabia, who also claimed to follow as-Salafu as-Salih. The name “Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj*” did not originate from the group but was assigned by external entities to distinguish it from the broader as-Salafu as-Salih group. Arrazy, a researcher of the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj*, clarified that the label “Wahabi” was given by their opponents, not by the group itself. Therefore, the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* is a community that claims to follow the as-Salafu as-Salih *manhaj* attributed to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab.<sup>2</sup>

The Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* group has developed its ideologies within society and established international networks. While not institutionally registered in countries, they thrive culturally within communities, both in Indonesia and internationally. Initially, their thoughts focused on purifying Islamic teachings from elements considered polytheistic and innovative. They actively invited the community to purify Islamic teachings from what they perceived as polytheistic and creative practices. They formed study circles (*halaqah*) as a platform for preaching and established *madrasas* and schools as educational institutions to propagate their teachings. Additionally, they demonstrated proficiency in information and communication technology, utilizing various media channels such as print, electronic media, and mass media, including magazines, newspapers, radio, television, Facebook, Instagram, and other communication platforms. Their positive impacts

have been observed both internationally and nationally.<sup>3</sup>

Gradually, the thoughts and actions of the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* evolved toward actions aimed at eradicating what they deemed as polytheistic and innovative practices within other Muslim groups. This led to increased intolerance toward the general differences present in Muslim society. They engaged in vandalism of historical Muslim sites, and according to many Muslim scholars and witnesses, they were involved in numerous killings of Muslims and scholars outside their group. Their thoughts and actions have stirred unrest and conflicts on both the international and national stages. As noted by Sheikh Idharam, a prominent scholar from Syria, Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Buthi, the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* group has committed numerous crimes on Earth, merely changing their attire from the Wahabi group to the Salafi group. The shift in naming from Wahabi to Salafi indicates a political move, as the term Wahabism became unpopular; hence, they replaced it with the Salafi label. Despite their efforts in Islamic law and teaching socialization through preaching, their thoughts and actions have generated unrest on both the international and national levels.<sup>4</sup>

Many international and national incidents and conflicts are suspected to be associated with the Salafi-Wahabi group. The impactful events of September 11, 2001, involving the crashing of American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center and United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower, are believed to be linked to the Salafi-Wahabi group. Many international and national terrorist organizations are thought to be affiliated with the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj*. On a national scale, conflicts, such as the bombing of the Ekayana Graha Buddhist temple, are also suspected to be carried out by the Salafi-Wahabi group in Indonesia. This group in Indonesia is

<sup>1</sup> Faizah Faizah, “Pergulatan Teologi Salafi Dalam Mainstream Keberagamaan Masyarakat Sasak,” *Ulumuna*, vol. 16, no. 2 (2012), pp. 375–402, <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v16i2.183>.

<sup>2</sup> Zaenal Abidin, “Wahabisme, Transnasionalisme Dan Gerakan-Gerakan Radikal Islam Di Indonesia,” *TASĀMUH*, vol. 12, no. 2 (1 Juni 2015), pp. 130–48.

<sup>3</sup> Unggul Purnomo Aji dan Kerwanto, “Teologi Wahabi: Sejarah, Pemikiran Dan Perkembangannya,” *El-Adabi: Jurnal Studi Islam*, vol. 2, no. 1 (28 Maret 2023), pp. 45–61, <https://doi.org/10.59166/el-adabi.v2i1.42>.

<sup>4</sup> Zunly Nadia Nadia, “Perilaku Keagamaan Komunitas Muslim (Pemahaman Hadis Dalam NU Dan Salafi Wahabi Di Indonesia),” *Jurnal Living Hadis*, vol. 2, no. 2 (15 Oktober 2017), pp. 141–77, <https://doi.org/10.14421/livinghadis.2017.1327>.

closely associated with fundamentalist, radical, and terrorist ideologies, all of which pose opportunities for conflicts within society.<sup>5</sup>

The arising question is whether the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* group consistently engages in terrorism within society, leading to conflicts. How do they conduct *istibath al-ahkam* (deriving legal rulings) and legal socialization, and what are their patterns of social interaction within the diverse society of North Sumatra?

## Method

This study is categorized as non-doctrinal legal research, as the researcher will examine, explain, and analyze how legal socialization is pursued by the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* group and its impact on the potential for conflict in social interaction and disharmony among different religious communities in North Sumatra due to the adopted Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj*. The sample includes only a few individuals who can represent the population. Sampling in this research is determined through snowball sampling, where the researcher will initially identify one individual as a sample representing the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj*, and subsequently, the researcher will obtain further informants from the initial sample. Data for this research comes from two sources: primary data sources and secondary data sources. Primary data is obtained from field sources, specifically information from the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* community in North Sumatra, including teachers, religious leaders (*ustadz*), and followers. Second, documentary study, where the researcher examines the fatwas issued by scholars, mujtahids, and muftis from the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj*, such as fatwas from Sheikh Muhammad Nasiruddin Albani, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, Sheikh Muhammad Usaimin, and others. Third, observation, involving direct observation of the Islamic legal socialization carried out by the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* group within the community and analyzing the positive and negative impacts of their legal socialization in North Sumatra.

<sup>5</sup> Nurbiah Pohan, "Pemahaman Dakwah Keagamaan Salafi Dan Kegaduhan Di Tengah Masyarakat Serta Solusi Penyelesaiannya," *An-Nahdhah : Jurnal Pendidikan, Komunikasi Dan Keagamaan*, vol. 5, no. 2 (2022), <https://jurnal.stai-nias.ac.id/index.php/annahdhah/article/view/54>.

## Results and Discussion

### The Profil of Salafi-Wahabi Manhaj

The Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* consists of three factions, each faction has similarities and differences. Their similarity lies in their shared understanding of purifying Islamic teachings by cleansing society of thoughts and actions related to shirk (associating partners with Allah) and *bid'ah* (innovation in religious practices). They share a common vision of purifying Islamic teachings from forms of shirk and *bid'ah*. The differences lie in the concentration of each faction on implementing its mission, differentiating one faction from another.<sup>6</sup>

The first faction is the *puritanism* faction. This group focuses more on purifying religious teachings, preaching, and education. They are called *puritans* because their main mission is to explain to the community the pure teachings of Islam free from shirk and *bid'ah*.<sup>7</sup> Their other activities include educating the public by establishing educational institutions such as *pesantrens* (Islamic boarding schools), schools, madrasahs, and Islamic higher education institutions. Engaging in scholarly activities, they are also known as the Salafi-Wahabi *Ilmi* group due to their involvement in knowledge. They conduct educational preaching with gentleness and peace, avoiding physical violence. Their mission emphasizes preaching and education. This group avoids political movements, does not oppose legitimate governance, and adheres to the doctrine that followers must follow legitimate leaders and refrain from demonstrating on the streets as an act of opposition to authorities and legitimate governance. They continue preaching within the community to keep people away from shirk and *bid'ah*. They reject political discussions and opposition to the government, leading to the label "rejectionist" for this faction. Thus, this first faction is often referred to as the *puritan*, *ilmi*, and *rejectionist* faction.

<sup>6</sup> Abdul Mu'id, "Bahaya Pemikiran Wahabi," *JURNAL ILMU PENGETAHUAN DAN PENDIDIKAN ISLAM*, vol. 11, no. 11 (19 Juni 2023), pp. 17–25.

<sup>7</sup> Muhammad Zainal Abidin and Yulia Hafizah, "Conflict and Integration in The Salafi-Wahabi Purification Movement in South Kalimantan," *Wawasan: Jurnal Ilmiah Agama Dan Sosial Budaya*, vol. 4, no. 2 (31 Desember 2019), pp. 191–201, <https://doi.org/10.15575/jw.v4i2.6194>.

The second faction is the *haraki* faction, as this group focuses more on movement activities. They tend to form social power, create community groups, and establish legal parties within the community and the state. This group desires the reform of Islamic law and teachings to adapt to the current situation and conditions of the Muslim community. The *haraki* group is characterized by ideas and thoughts for reform. They consistently criticize oppressive governments and advocate for reforms within the community, earning them the label Salafi-Wahabi reformist as a counterpart to the rejectionist faction, which opposes government policies and legitimate authorities. This group is more focused on reform movements within the country compared to the *ilmi* group mentioned earlier, which is more dominant in the field of knowledge. This faction is more active in practical actions than the development of religious theories.

The third faction is the *jihadi* faction. This group is more focused on jihad actions to defend weak Muslim communities and even aspires to establish an Islamic state (*khilafah Islami*) to protect the entire Muslim community. They concentrate on tangible actions, tending to oppose legitimate governments that do not align with their thoughts.<sup>8</sup> They often declare themselves as engaging in jihad *qusuri*, meaning jihad against the palace, and they name the Salafi-Wahabi *ilmi* group as the jihad *quburi* group because they frequently discuss graves. This group usually emphasizes discussions about the caliphate in Islam, believing that addressing the current oppression requires jihad. They often engage in preaching through violent means.

### ***Istinbath al-Ahkam* (Derivation of Legal Rulings) in the Salafi-Wahabi Methodology**

The Salafi-Wahabi group engages in the derivation of legal rulings (*istinbath al-ahkam*) in a manner similar to the methodologies of other Sunni schools of thought. The Salafi-Wahhabi adherents employ textual evidence (*dalil-dalil nas*) and non-textual evidence (*dalil-*

*dalil ghairu nas*) as outlined by experts in the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*usul fiqh*). They use the Quran and Hadith as primary legal sources, requiring all legal cases or events to refer back to these two sources. In each legal opinion (*fatwa*), they present evidence from the Quran and Hadith. The evidence utilized by the Salafi-Wahabi group includes the Quran, Hadith, consensus (*ijma'*), analogy (*qiyas*), public interest (*maslahah mursalah*), juristic preference (*istihsan*), customary practices (*urf*), the presumption of continuity (*istishab*), the sayings of *sahaby/tabieen* (*qaul sahaby/tabi'in/tabi'tabiin*), blocking the means (*saddu zari'ah*), and preceding legislative rulings (*syar'u man qablana*).<sup>9</sup>

The steps taken by the Salafi-Wahhabi group in the derivation of legal rulings are divided into two forms of juristic reasoning (*ijtihad*): the first is *intitqa'i ijtihad*, and the second is *insya'i ijtihad*. The steps involved in the Salafi-Wahabi group's *intitqa'i ijtihad* are as follows: first, finding evidence in the Quran; second, finding evidence in the Hadith; third, seeking the opinions of the Companions; fourth, seeking the opinions of the *tabi'in*; fifth, seeking the views of the *tabi'tabiin*; sixth, adopting the opinion of previous *mujtahid* scholars (*mujtahid mutlaq*); and seventh, conducting *ijtihad*. According to their perspective, *ijtihad* is the last step if the issue has not been addressed and studied by the righteous predecessors (*as-salafu as-salih*).<sup>10</sup>

For *insya'i ijtihad*, the Salafi-Wahabi group follows these steps: first, understanding the legal case in question; second, searching for general evidence that can be applied to the legal case; and third, issuing a *fatwa*. In summary, the Salafi-Wahabi group's approach to the derivation of legal rulings is not significantly different from other groups within *Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah*. However, they tend to lean towards the Hanbali school in jurisprudence, emphasizing adherence to *nasirussunnah* (textual evidence from the Prophet's

<sup>8</sup> Rusli Rusli, "Wahhabi Salafism's View on Maqasid al-Syari'ah," *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam*, vol. 8, no. 2 (2014), pp. 167–80, <https://doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v8i2.406>.

<sup>9</sup> Azmi Armaya, *Metode Istinbatul Ahkam Salafi-Wahabi; Analisis Sosialisasi Hukum dan Pengaruhnya dalam Interaksi Sosial di Sumatera Utara*, (Sumatra Utara: UINSU Press, 2023).

<sup>10</sup> Khairul Hamim, "Metode Istinbath Hukum Muhammad Ibn Shalih Al-Utahymin," *istinbath*, vol. 18, no. 2 (2019), <https://istinbath.or.id/index.php/ijhi/article/view/172>.



traditions). If clear evidence from the Quran and Hadith is lacking, they refer to the statements and practices of the companions, *tabiin*, and *tabi'tabiin*, prioritizing these over independent reasoning. In *intitqa'i ijtiḥad tarjihi*, the Salafi-Wahhabi group consistently chooses opinions closest to the apparent textual evidence, not adhering to specific methodologies of existing schools of thought, hence referring to themselves as non-affiliated (*la mazhab*), yet followers of the Salafi methodology.<sup>11</sup> In *insya'i ijtiḥad*<sup>12</sup>, they follow a methodology that involves understanding the legal case (*fiqh waqii*) before referencing apparent textual evidence, the generality of evidence, and absolute evidence. If these three are absent, they explore other epistemologies in Islamic law, namely *bayani*, *ta'lili*, and *istislahi*.<sup>13</sup> Overall, the method of deriving legal rulings within the Salafi-Wahhabi group is broadly consistent with the formulations by scholars, mujtahids, and muftis within the *Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah* group. This methodology is also applied by the Salafi-Wahabi group in North Sumatra, as evidenced by the utilization of textbooks that reference works by scholars from the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali schools. They also study books like Fathul Qadir, al-Muwattha', al-Umm, Kifayatul Akhyar, Syrah Muhazzab, and various other texts.

### Socialization of Islamic Law by the Salafi-Wahabi Group in North Sumatra

#### Socialization of Islamic Law within the Family

One of the distinctive features of the Salafi-Wahabi community is its strong emphasis on family in their preaching (*da'wah*). They prioritize the dissemination of Islamic law, starting within the

family. The primary target of the Salafi-Wahhabi group's preaching and socialization of Islamic law is their respective families. Each family member who attends Salafi-Wahabi study sessions strives to share the knowledge within their own family. Husbands provide teachings and enlightenment to their family members—wives, children, parents, siblings, and other close relatives—after receiving instruction or guidance from their teachers in study circles (*halaqah*). They refrain from conducting teachings or enlightenment sessions for different groups until their family members have participated and understood the teachings of their group.<sup>14</sup> Suppose a husband is not well-versed in religious matters or is unable to explain Islamic teachings to his family, especially when it involves the Quran and Hadith. In that case, they bring their family members, particularly wives and children, to learn together from a teacher with a better understanding of Islamic teachings. Husbands, wives, and children attend classes with a teacher, often held in study circles or rotating between homes or mosques.<sup>15</sup>

It is relatively easy to recognize and identify members of the Salafi-Wahabi group. Men typically wear long pants above the ankles and below the knees, along with long-sleeved shirts and a robe (*gamis*). According to Salafi-Wahabi beliefs, extending pants beyond the ankles is considered prohibited in Islamic teachings, and they view it as violating the Sunnah of the Prophet, deeming it sinful. This act of extending pants to ankle length is known as *isbal*, and such actions are referred to as *isbal*. They rarely wear sarongs and always wear these clothes during prayers. In prayer lines, they strive to connect their feet with those of their fellow worshippers, ensuring an unbroken prayer row. After completing congregational prayers, there are two possibilities: either they engage in silent individual remembrance (*zikir*)

<sup>11</sup> Abdul Majid et. al, "Salafi, Hadith, and Islamic Law: Identity Politics and Wahabi Movement in East Kalimantan," *AHKAM : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah*, vol. 23, no. 1 (22 Juni 2023), <https://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/ahkam/article/view/32139>.

<sup>12</sup> Ahmad Ash Shiddieqy, Padlan Padil Simamora, and Dinda Difia Madina, "Contemporary Islamic Politics in Tunisia: The Journey of Islamic Democracy Post-Arab Spring," *MILRev: Metro Islamic Law Review*, vol. 3, no. 1 (11 April 2024), pp. 119–40, <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v3i1.8976>.

<sup>13</sup> Zainab Akmal and Sheikh Adnan Ahmed Usmani, "Digital Rights and Women's Empowerment in Pakistan: An Analysis of Contemporary Islamic Legal Perspectives in the Age of Social Media," *MILRev : Metro Islamic Law Review*, vol. 3, no. 1 (11 April 2024), pp. 95–118, <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v3i1.8642>.

<sup>14</sup> Ridwan Na, "Salafisme Di Papua, Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Mengenai Kelompok Salafi-Wahhabi Ja'far Umar Thalib," *ISLAM NUSANTARA: Journal for the Study of Islamic History and Culture*, vol. 2, no. 2 (27 Juli 2021), pp. 45–68, <https://doi.org/10.47776/islamnusantara.v3i1.67>.

<sup>15</sup> Erman Adia Kusumah, "Wahabi: Politik Agama Dan Hasrat Kekuasaan Di Indonesia," *Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama Dan Lintas Budaya*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2019), pp. 58–63, <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v4i1.7296>.

or, shortly after finishing the prayer, they leave the congregation. They prioritize praying on time and always strive to be in the front row, even if they enter the mosque late. Other Muslim groups sometimes view such behavior as impolite and disrespectful to local religious leaders. According to local customs, precedence is given to the community's religious figures in the front row before others join. If scholars and teachers already occupy the front row, only then do local community members fill the subsequent rows. However, Salafi-Wahabi members believe that anyone has the right to be in the front row as long as they can secure that position.

The Salafi-Wahabi community frequently engages in group discussions (*muzakarah*) within mosques and ensures timely prayers. They often organize study sessions in various corners of the mosque and its terraces. Consequently, Muslim men from the Salafi-Wahabi group acquire knowledge from mosques, and the results of these studies are shared with their families. Members of the Salafi-Wahabi community are often involved in various professions, such as traders, farmers, teachers, religious instructors, and businesspeople. There are very few who work as civil servants or employees of companies.

The Salafi-Wahabi community consistently preaches and socializes Islamic law within their families. Doctrines of Islamic teachings are primarily conveyed to family members. The doctrines consistently emphasized within the family cover issues related to *tawhid* (monotheism), worship, and clothing. As a result of the doctrines of *tawhid* regarding lordship, worship, and attributes and names, Salafi-Wahabi members classify individuals into Muslims, disbelievers (*kafir*), and polytheists (*musyrik*). Family members who do not recognize Allah as the sole Creator and Ruler of the Universe are deemed disbelievers. A Muslim who does not worship Allah or worships Allah but also prays to others in a manner inconsistent with Islamic law is considered a polytheist. Within the family, it is consistently emphasized that venerating teachers, religious leaders, or historical objects is forbidden and could lead to acts of polytheism if it involves seeking blessings and intercession from these individuals, whether alive or deceased.

The doctrines and teachings conveyed to family members also address issues related to excessive reverence for historical objects in Islam, such as the graves of religious leaders and teachers. *Tawhid* is the primary doctrine consistently communicated to family members.

### **Socialization of Islamic Law in Study Circles (*Halaqah*)**

The second socialization of Islamic law occurs during regular study circles within the Salafi-Wahabi community. One of the teachings of the Salafi-Wahabi group is to enjoin good and forbid evil (*amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar*), leading them to encourage others to do good and prevent wrongdoing consistently. In their daily lives, members of the Salafi-Wahabi group often garner sympathy within the community because they consistently engage in righteous actions that do not violate Islamic law. They pray punctually and always invite others to worship Allah. They not only invite but also set an example in worship and social interactions with the community. The lives of Salafi-Wahabi families are immersed in worship, business, and learning or study. Despite their exclusive nature towards others in their daily lives, they earn sympathy from other Muslim communities.<sup>16</sup>

Initially, only one member of a Salafi-Wahabi family is part of the group. However, when other family members observe that this individual consistently prays on time without disturbing others, they develop sympathy and eventually join study sessions and listen to lectures from Salafi-Wahabi scholars. During this phase, Salafi-Wahabi members often engage in dialogue with sympathetic community members. Gradually, they persuade these individuals, be they family members or other community members attending the mosque, to participate in study sessions with them. Salafi-Wahabi members are adept at communicating with the general public, supported by the appropriateness of their words and actions,

<sup>16</sup> Cut Lusi Chairun Nisak and Tuthi' Mazidar Rohmah, "Dinamika Konflik Antar Wahabi Dan Aswaja Di Aceh," *SINTHOP: Media Kajian Pendidikan, Agama, Sosial Dan Budaya*, vol. 2, no. 1 (10 Juni 2023), pp. 1–10, <https://doi.org/10.22373/sinthop.v2i1.2774>.

creating sympathy within the community. Thus, initially, Salafi-Wahabi study sessions usually commence with meetings in mosques or within the core family and extended family community, ultimately expanding into larger Salafi-Wahabi gatherings.<sup>17</sup>

### **Socialization of Islamic Law in Educational Institutions**

After members of the Salafi-Wahabi group engage in preaching and socialize Islamic law within their immediate families, they proceed to extend their preaching to their extended families. The Salafi-Wahabi preaching in North Sumatra follows the method of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), starting with the closest family members. Once successful, they continue their preaching in mosques. They prefer gathering in mosques rather than outside, such as the proliferating coffee shops. As a result of preaching and socialization of Islamic law within families and mosques, the next step involves forming a community. These communities are usually led by a religious teacher (*ustadz*).<sup>18</sup>

The role of the *ustadz* in the community is typically to guide its members. They deliver lectures on monotheism (*tawhid*), Islamic law, and other teachings of Islam. When the *ustadz* has established a community and has financial resources, they often proceed to establish educational institutions. These educational institutions serve as a platform for the younger generation, especially the children of the Salafi-Wahabi community, to acquire knowledge. These educational institutions become places where young individuals learn about the teachings of the Salafi-Wahabi group.

In North Sumatra, based on research findings, the first formal educational institution of the Salafi-Wahabi group was the as-Sunnah Educational Foundation located in Lau Bakery near Darul Arafah

Islamic Boarding School. It later moved to the Tanjung Morawa District and is now situated on Jl. Medan-Tanjung Morawa Km 13, Gang Darmo, Bangun Sari Village, Tanjung Morawa District, Deli Serdang Regency, North Sumatra. From this school, scholars, *ustadz*, and preachers from the Salafi-Wahabi group have emerged since 2002, initially named Ma'had' Aly as-Sunnah.

The socialization of teachings and Islamic law through educational institutions within the Salafi-Wahabi group in North Sumatra began at the Ma'had Aly as-Sunnah institution in 2002. Initially providing lessons in the Arabic language and Islamic sciences up to the D III level, the teachings of the Salafi-Wahabi group were imparted at this campus. In 2012, Ma'had Aly as-Sunnah transformed into the as-Sunnah Islamic Higher Education with the issuance of Director General of Islamic Education Decree No. DJ.I/149/2012. During the Ma'had Aly as-Sunnah era, the institution graduated students from 10 batches, approximately 189 alums. Since 2012, the as-Sunnah Institute of Islamic Education has offered six study programs: Arabic Language Education, Islamic Religious Education, Communication and Islamic Broadcasting, Guidance and Islamic Counseling, Sharia Economic Law, and a Language Preparation Program.

Another educational institution within the Salafi-Wahabi group is Ma'had Abu Ubaidah, established in Medan in 2005. Its full name is Ma'had Abu Ubaidah bin al-Jarrah. Initially, this educational institution focused on Arabic language and Islamic studies under the supervision of the Asia Muslim Charity Foundation (AMCF) in Medan. It initially collaborated with the University of Muhammadiyah North Sumatra (UMSU) and is now located at Jl. Kutilang No. 22, Sei Sikambing B, Medan Sunggal Subdistrict. The campus offers programs in Arabic language and Islamic studies, integrated S-1 Ma'had-FAI UMSU, integrated S1 Ma'had STEIBIS, Qur'anic Recitation, Qur'an Memorization, Intensive Arabic Language Course, Qur'an Memorization Guidance, and Tajwid Guidance. Professors at Ma'had Abu Ubaidah are alumni of leading universities in the Middle East, such as those in Medina, Sudan, Syria, LIPIA Jakarta, and others. They engage in three months

<sup>17</sup> Ayu Juniarti and H. M. H. Abubakar, "Menelusik Isu Wahabi Di Muhammadiyah Tahun 2012-2018," *Syams: Jurnal Kajian Keislaman*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1 Juli 2021), <https://doi.org/10.23971/js.v2i1.3028>.

<sup>18</sup> B. J. Sujibto and Ikram Filiz, "Seizing the Opportunity: Dynamics of the Salafi-Wahabi Movement in Turkey," *Jurnal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat: Media Pemikiran Dan Dakwah Pembangunan*, vol. 7, no. 1 (26 Juli 2023), pp. 1–26, <https://doi.org/10.14421/jpm.2023.071-01>.

of missionary training and send the preachers to remote villages throughout the archipelago, especially in North Sumatra. The preachers are tasked with promoting mosque activities, teaching Quranic recitation and writing, conducting lectures on monotheism (*tawhid*), jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and more.<sup>19</sup>

Furthermore, the socialization of Islamic law through educational institutions includes Ma'had Aly Ulunnuha, under the auspices of the Minhajussunnah Foundation in Medan. This foundation has been established since 2010, with a motto always to teach Islam in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah. The foundation has managed education from Raudhatul Atfal (Kindergarten), Elementary School, Junior High School, Senior High School, Boarding School, and Ma'had Aly (Islamic Institute). It was founded by Ustadz Meidy Eka Ginardi, Lc, M.A, known as Abu Ihsan, Ali Nur, Lc, Abdul Fattah bin Syarif, and others, recognized as influential figures of Salafi-Wahabi in Medan. The head of the Boarding School at the Minhajussunnah Foundation is Ahmad Pinta Tarigan, Lc, an alumnus of Ma'had Aly As-Sunnah.

### Socialization of Islamic Law through Media

The Salafi-Wahabi community also engages in the socialization of Islamic law through various media channels, including print and electronic media. One notable advantage of the Salafi-Wahabi community is their mastery of information and communication technology. The thoughts and legal teachings of the Salafi-Wahabi community are accessible to the public through bulletins, websites, YouTube channels, and television media. In Indonesia, many bulletins published by the Salafi-Wahabi community can be found, such as Majallah Sunnah published by the as-Sunnah Foundation in Yogyakarta. In North Sumatra, nearly every Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) has its bulletin. Additionally, individual religious teachers (*ustadz*) often have their own YouTube

channels, such as Ustadz Basalamah's channel, Ustadz Firanda's channel, and others in Indonesia, and Ustadz Ali Nur's channel, Ustadz Abul Fattah's channel, as well as the radio and television of the ar-Risalah al-Khairat Foundation of the As-Sunnah Islamic College in North Sumatra. This indicates that the Salafi-Wahabi community continues its socialization of Islamic law through mass media, both in printed forms such as books and in electronic forms like digital media, websites, and YouTube channels.<sup>20</sup>

Several doctrines within the Salafi-Wahabi group have the potential to cause conflict and disharmony within North Sumatran society. These doctrines include the concepts of *tabdi'*, *tadlil*, *takfir*, *musyrik*, the belief that learning should only be from Salafi-Wahabi teachers, and the promotion of *amar ma'ruf and nahi mungkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil). The Salafi-Wahabi group often issues warnings (*tahdzir*), accuses others of innovation (*tabdi'*), and labels others as deviant (*tadlil*). They are even known to issue warnings, accusations of innovation, and allegations of deviance against prominent scholars such as Imam Ghazali, Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Buti, and Wahbah az-Zuhayli. The Salafi-Wahabi group often interprets the concept of *bid'ah* (innovation) narrowly, leading to the classification of those with differing views as *ahlu bid'ah*, without tolerance for differences in understanding. This often leads to disharmony and conflict within society. The term *bid'ah* is frequently conveyed by the Salafi-Wahabi group in their teachings, education, and through the fatwas of their scholars. For example, regarding the practice of remaining silent (*saktah*) after reciting Surah al-Fatihah and saying "Amin" to allow the congregation to recite Surah al-Fatihah, according to the fatwa of Muhammad Nasiruddin Albani, this practice is considered an innovation (*bid'ah*) because Prophet Muhammad did not do it, and neither did his companions. Another example is related to the practice of regularly reciting Surah al-Jumu'ah and Surah al-Munafiqun

<sup>19</sup> Sofyan A. P. Kau, Zulkarnain Suleman, and Irwan, "Traditional Islamic Religious Practice Arguments: Criticism of The Concept of Bid'ah of Islam Salafi-Wahabi," *Al-Ulum*, vol. 23, no. 1 (15 Juni 2023), pp. 1–20, <https://doi.org/10.30603/au.v23i1.3498>.

<sup>20</sup> Slamet Muliono, Andi Suwarko, and Zaky Ismail Ismail, "Gerakan Salafi Dan Deradikalisasi Islam Di Indonesia," *Religio Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama*, vol. 9, no. 2 (16 September 2019), pp. 244–66, <https://doi.org/10.15642/religio.v9i2.1207>.



during the Maghrib and Isha prayers on Friday nights. According to Imam Muhammad Nasiruddin Albani, this is considered an innovation frequently practiced by imams in mosques.<sup>21</sup>

Furthermore, another example of innovation for the Salafi-Wahabi group is the recitation of the Quran at gravesites. Many Muslim groups recite verses from the Quran as a gift to the deceased in the grave. According to the Salafi-Wahabi perspective, this is considered a hated innovation, following the views expressed by Imam Abu Hanifah, Malik, and Ahmad.

Based on field observations, one characteristic of the Salafi-Wahabi group with the potential to cause disharmony and conflict within society is the practice of *tahzir*. This term, originating from Arabic (حذر-يحذر-تحذير), means to warn or advise caution. In the Salafi-Wahabi context, *tahzir* means warning others about mistakes or wrongdoing as a form of vigilance. The Salafi-Wahabi group frequently engages in this practice, where scholars, jurists, muftis, teachers, or leaders within the Salafi-Wahabi community issue warnings to other groups or individuals who disagree with their beliefs. As a result of *tahzir*, dissatisfaction or even anger may arise, leading to disharmony and conflict among Salafi-Wahabi community members. The consequences of *tahzir* can sometimes result in *hajr mu'tadi*, which is isolation imposed by the group issuing the warning against the targeted person or group for their perceived innovations. This concept of *tahzir* is common within the Salafi-Wahabi community, and it is a contributing factor to the proliferation of various factions, sects, and groups within the community. For instance, Salafi-Wahabi groups in different regions may issue *tahzir* against each other, resulting in the emergence of new factions or groups.<sup>22</sup>

The concept of *takfir* is another belief that can cause disharmony and conflicts in society. The Salafi-Wahabi community is characterized by numerous factions, broadly categorized as puritanical, activist, and jihadist. Each faction tends to denounce the others, leading to a culture of mutual excommunication (*takfir*). The Salafi-Jihadi faction, in particular, frequently declares members of the Salafi-Haraki and Salafi-'Ilmi groups as disbelievers (*kafir*). According to their perspective, Muslims who tolerate unIslamic governments support tyrants, and anyone supporting such governments is considered a disbeliever because they do not adhere to the laws of Allah and follow governments established by divine guidance. This viewpoint aligns with the Khawarij's tendency to excommunicate others. The concept of *takfir* within the Salafi-Wahabi community, especially within the Jihadi faction, has the potential to generate disharmony and conflict in society. The conflict not only extends within the Muslim community but also between different religious communities and the state. The Salafi-Jihadi faction's desire to establish an Islamic state is perceived as a threat by other religious groups, leading to accusations of *takfir* against Muslims who do not share their views.<sup>23</sup>

The concept of *musyrik* (associating partners with Allah) is another belief within the Salafi-Wahabi ideology that can cause disharmony and conflict. The Salafi-Wahabi group often accuses other Muslim groups of engaging in acts of shirk (polytheism) for practices such as *tabarruk* (seeking blessings), *tawassul* (seeking intercession), and reciting the Quran at gravesites. According to Salafi-Wahabi beliefs, *tauhid* (the oneness of Allah) comprises three aspects: *rububiyyah* (lordship), *uluhiyyah* (worship), and *asma wa sifat* (names and attributes). They argue that Muslims and non-Muslims alike recognize *rububiyyah*, the concept of Allah as the Creator and Sustainer. However, Salafi-Wahabis claim that some Muslims engage in acts similar to polytheism by seeking blessings, seeking intercession, and

<sup>21</sup> Sindi Pramita, Ade Ilfah, and Sapri Sapri, "Studi Akidah : Konsep Teologi Dalam Pemikiran Asy'ariyah, Salafi Dan Wahabi," *Asian Journal of Islamic Studies and Da'wah*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2024), pp. 58–69, <https://doi.org/10.58578/ajisd.v2i1.2423>.

<sup>22</sup> Khoirul Muhtadi, "Deradikalisasi Politik Wahabi-Syiah Dalam Konteks Madzhab Tafsir KelIndonesiaan," *Syariat: Jurnal Studi Al-Qur'an Dan Hukum*, vol. 1, no. 02 (1 November 2015), pp. 249–58, <https://doi.org/10.32699/syariat.v1i02.1113>.

<sup>23</sup> Faizin Faizin and Afridawati Afridawati, "The Salafi Da'wah Movement and Its Implications on Religious Rituals in Kota Sungai Penuh," *Ishlah: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin, Adab Dan Dakwah*, vol. 5, no. 1 (30 Juni 2023), pp. 133–44, <https://doi.org/10.32939/ishlah.v5i1.246>.

reciting the Quran at gravesites. This accusation can lead to disharmony and conflict within society, particularly with groups like Nahdlatul Ulama, who engage in these practices. Members of Nahdlatul Ulama argue that their actions are not polytheistic but are instead acts of seeking blessings (*tabarruk*) from righteous individuals and using them as intermediaries for supplication. They emphasize that their prayers are directed to Allah alone. The conflict arises due to the Salafi-Wahabi group's refusal to engage in dialogue with groups like Nahdlatul Ulama.<sup>24</sup>

Additionally, the Salafi-Wahhabi community holds the understanding that there are two types of congregations: one with knowledge and one without knowledge and weak faith. Consequently, members with weak faith and knowledge are prohibited from attending lectures and studying under teachers or scholars who are not affiliated with the Salafi-Wahabi group. As a result of this concept, Salafi-Wahhabi members often refuse to attend lectures given by scholars outside their group, leading to tensions and conflicts. For example, in Binjai and Serdang Bedagai, Salafi-Wahabi congregants left mosques during religious lectures, offending the scholars and their congregations.

## Conclusion

The findings indicate that the *istinbath al-ahkam* method applied by Salafi-Wahabi adheres to the principles of the *Ahlu Sunnah wal Jamaah*, though leaning towards the Hanbali school of thought. In legal socialization, Salafi-Wahabi initiates it from the smallest social units to educational institutions and media, with a focus on study circles (*halaqah*). This legal socialization enhances legal awareness among the people of North Sumatra but also brings the potential for conflict and disharmony. Certain teachings within the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj*, such as *tabdi'*, *tadlil*, *tahzir*, *takfiri*, and the restriction of learning exclusively from Salafi-Wahabi scholars, have the potential to create tension among groups and religious communities. While not all members of

the Salafi-Wahabi *manhaj* share identical views, a majority tends to embrace these controversial concepts. Therefore, extremist ideologies emerging within the Salafi-Wahabi Jihadist faction pose a potential threat to national political stability. The legal socialization carried out by the Salafi-Wahabi group varies according to the capabilities of those involved in legal socialization. The socialization of Islamic law begins at the smallest level, namely the household, through study circles (*halaqah*) or study groups. The socialization of Islamic law in these study groups is led by *ustadz* or preachers within the Salafi-Wahabi group. Currently, the *ustadz* in the Salafi-Wahabi community in North Sumatra are mostly alums of the Ar-Risalah al-Khairat Foundation or the Higher Education of Islamic Religion (STAIS) as-Sunnah. Islamic law socialization through these study circles has two forms: open socialization for all Muslims and closed socialization specifically for members of the Salafi-Wahabi group. The closed study circles are often found in the Salafi-Jihadi faction. The third form of Islamic law socialization is through educational institutions. The fourth form is through media, both print and electronic, including digital media. The Salafi-Wahabi group has a strong influence on communication media, with bulletins, websites, YouTube channels, and even radio and television. The potential for conflict in social interactions and inter-religious disharmony in North Sumatra arises not from the method of deriving legal rulings (*istibath al-ahkam*) employed by the Salafi-Wahabi group but from their socialization of Islamic law.

## References

- Abidin, Muhammad Zainal, and Yulia Hafizah, "Conflict and Integration in The Salafi-Wahabi Purification Movement in South Kalimantan," *Wawasan: Jurnal Ilmiah Agama Dan Sosial Budaya*, vol. 4, no. 2, 31 Desember 2019. <https://doi.org/10.15575/jw.v4i2.6194>.
- Abidin, Zaenal, "Wahabisme, Transnasionalisme Dan Gerakan-Gerakan Radikal Islam Di Indonesia," *TASÂMUH*, vol. 12, no. 2, 1 Juni 2015.
- Aji, Unggul Purnomo, dan Kerwanto, "Teologi Wahabi: Sejarah, Pemikiran Dan Perkembangan-

<sup>24</sup> Endang Madali, "Pandangan Hukum Islam Terhadap Intoleransi Salafi Wahabi," *Nurani Hukum*, vol. 3, no. 2 (21 Oktober 2020), pp. 30–48, <https://doi.org/10.51825/nhk.v3i2.9107>.

- nya.” *El-Adabi: Jurnal Studi Islam*, vol. 2, no. 1, 28 Maret 2023. <https://doi.org/10.59166/el-adabi.v2i1.42>.
- Akmal, Zainab, and Sheikh Adnan Ahmed Usmani, “Digital Rights and Women’s Empowerment in Pakistan: An Analysis of Contemporary Islamic Legal Perspectives in the Age of Social Media,” *MILRev : Metro Islamic Law Review*, vol. 3, no. 1, 11 April 2024. <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v3i1.8642>.
- Armaya, Azmi, *Metode Istinbatul Ahkam Salafi-Wahabi; Analisis Sosialisasi Hukum dan Pengaruhnya dalam Interaksi Sosial di Sumatera Utara*, Sumatra Utara: UINSU Press, 2023.
- Faizah, Faizah, “Pergulatan Teologi Salafi Dalam Mainstream Keberagamaan Masyarakat Sasak,” *Ulumuna*, vol. 16, no. 2, 2012. <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v16i2.183>.
- Faizin, Faizin, and Afridawati Afridawati, “The Salafi Da’wah Movement and Its Implications on Religious Rituals in Kota Sungai Penuh,” *Ishlah: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin, Adab Dan Dakwah*, vol. 5, no. 1, 30 Juni 2023. <https://doi.org/10.32939/ishlah.v5i1.246>.
- Hamim, Khairul, “Metode Istinbath Hukum Muhammad Ibn Shalih Al-Utahymin.” *istinbath*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2019. <https://istinbath.or.id/index.php/ijhi/article/view/172>.
- Juniarti, Ayu, and H. M. H. Abubakar, “Menelusik Isu Wahabi Di Muhammadiyah Tahun 2012-2018.” *Syams: Jurnal Kajian Keislaman*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1 Juli 2021. <https://doi.org/10.23971/js.v2i1.3028>.
- Kau, Sofyan A. P., Zulkarnain Suleman, and Irwan, “Traditional Islamic Religious Practice Arguments: Criticism of The Concept of Bid’ah of Islam Salafi-Wahabi,” *Al-Ulum*, vol. 23, no. 1, 15 Juni 2023. <https://doi.org/10.30603/au.v23i1.3498>.
- Kusumah, Erman Adia, “Wahabi: Politik Agama Dan Hasrat Kekuasaan Di Indonesia,” *Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama Dan Lintas Budaya*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v4i1.7296>.
- Madali, Endang, “Pandangan Hukum Islam Terhadap Intoleransi Salafi Wahabi,” *Nurani Hukum*, vol. 3, no. 2, 21 Oktober 2020. <https://doi.org/10.51825/nhk.v3i2.9107>.
- Majid, Abdul, Mahdalena Nasrun, Novizal Wendry, Ruslan Sangaji, dan Abdul Hakim, “Salafi, Hadith, and Islamic Law: Identity Politics and Wahabi Movement in East Kalimantan,” *AHKAM : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah*, vol. 23, no. 1, 22 Juni 2023. <https://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/ahkam/article/view/32139>.
- Muhtadi, Khoirul, “Deradikalisasi Politik Wahabi-Syi’ah Dalam Konteks Madzhab Tafsir KelIndonesiaan,” *Syariati: Jurnal Studi Al-Qur’an Dan Hukum*, vol. 1, no. 02, 1 November 2015. <https://doi.org/10.32699/syariati.v1i02.1113>.
- Mu’id, Abdul, “Bahaya Pemikiran Wahabi,” *JURNAL ILMU PENGETAHUAN DAN PENDIDIKAN ISLAM*, vol. 11, no. 11, 19 Juni 2023.
- Muliono, Slamet, Andi Suwarko, and Zaky Ismail Ismail, “Gerakan Salafi Dan Deradikalisasi Islam Di Indonesia,” *Religio Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama*, vol. 9, no. 2, 16 September 2019. <https://doi.org/10.15642/religio.v9i2.1207>.
- Na, Ridwan, “Salafisme Di Papua, Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Mengenai Kelompok Salafi-Wahhabi Ja’far Umar Thalib,” *ISLAM NUSANTARA: Journal for the Study of Islamic History and Culture*, vol. 2, no. 2, 27 Juli 2021. <https://doi.org/10.47776/islamnusantara.v3i1.67>.
- Nadia, Zunly Nadia, “Perilaku Keagamaan Komunitas Muslim (Pemahaman Hadis Dalam NU Dan Salafi Wahabi Di Indonesia),” *Jurnal Living Hadis*, vol. 2, no. 2, 15 Oktober 2017. <https://doi.org/10.14421/livinghadis.2017.1327>.
- Nisak, Cut Lusi Chairun, and Tuthi’ Mazidar Rohmah, “Dinamika Konflik Antar Wahabi Dan Aswaja Di Aceh,” *SINTHOP: Media Kajian Pendidikan, Agama, Sosial Dan Budaya*, vol. 2, no. 1, 10 Juni 2023. <https://doi.org/10.22373/sinthop.v2i1.2774>.
- Pohan, Nurbiah, “Pemahaman Dakwah Keagamaan Salafi Dan Kegaduhan Di Tengah Masyarakat Serta Solusi Penyelesaiannya,” *An-Nahdhah: Jurnal Pendidikan, Komunikasi Dan Keagamaan*, vol. 5, no. 2, 2022. <https://jurnal.stai-nias.ac.id/index.php/annahdhah/article/view/54>.
- Pramita, Sindi, Ade Ilfah, and Sapri Sapri, “Studi Akidah : Konsep Teologi Dalam Pemikiran Asy’ariyah, Salafi Dan Wahabi,” *Asian Journal of Islamic Studies and Da’wah*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2024. <https://doi.org/10.58578/ajisd.v2i1.2423>.

Rusli, Rusli, "Wahhabi Salafism's View on Maqasid al-Syari'ah," *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam*, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014. <https://doi.org/10.24090/mnh.v8i2.406>.

Shiddieqy, Ahmad Ash, Padlan Padil Simamora, and Dinda Difia Madina, "Contemporary Islamic Politics in Tunisia: The Journey of Islamic Democracy Post-Arab Spring," *MILRev: Metro Islamic Law Review*, vol. 3, no. 1, 11 April 2024. <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v3i1.8976>.

Sujibto, B. J., and Ikram Filiz, "Seizing the Opportunity: Dynamics of the Salafi-Wahabi Movement in Turkey," *Jurnal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat: Media Pemikiran Dan Dakwah Pembangunan*, vol. 7, no. 1, 26 Juli 2023. <https://doi.org/10.14421/jpm.2023.071-01>.